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A CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHT TO BE 
"REASONABLY HEARD" 
KENNA v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
In Kenna v. United States District Court, the Ninth Circuit held that 
under the Crime Victim's Rights Act ("CYRA"), a crime victim's right 
to be "reasonably heard" during sentencing was not limited to written 
impact statements, but included the right to allocute at any public 
proceeding. 1 This was an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. 2 
"No court of appeals had addressed the scope of this particular CVRA 
right.,,3 Two district courts had considered this issue and had reached 
contrary decisions.4 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah that a plausible reading of the 
CYRA allowed for speaking in court, and upon analysis of the legislative 
history, concluded that "victims now have an indefeasible right to 
speak."s 
I Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011,1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 
18 U.S.c. § 3771 (a) states: "Rights of crime victims. --A crime victim has the following rights: ... 
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, 
plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2007). 
2 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 10 17. 
3 [d. at 1013. 
4 [d. Compare United States v. Degenhardt,405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (D. Utah 2005) 
(CVRA grants victims a right to speak), with United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 748 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (CVRA does not grant victims a right to speak in all situations). 
5 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1015-16. 
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1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Moshe and Zvi Leichner defrauded victims of nearly $100 million 
while claiming to invest the victims' money in foreign currency.6 Sixty-
plus victims proffered written victim impact statements, and several, 
including petitioner Kenna, spoke at Moshe's sentencing about the 
effects of the defendants' actions. 7 Moshe received a sentence of 240 
months in prison. 8 
Three months later Zvi was sentenced.9 The district court heard 
statements from the prosecutor and the defendant in accordance with 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4).IO However, the district 
court denied the victims an opportunity to speak. II The court stated, in 
part, "I listened to the victims the last time. . .. I don't think there's 
anything that any victim could say that would have any impact 
whatsoever. . .. There just isn't anything else that could possibly be 
said."I2 "Zvi was sentenced to 135 months in prison.,,13 "Kenna filed a 
timely petition for writ of mandamus" in accordance with the CVRA. 14 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for the court, addressed the 
issue of whether or not a district court could prohibit or limit a crime 
victim's speech to be "reasonably heard" under the CVRA. I5 
6 /d. at 10 12-10 13. Both "pleaded guilty to two cou nts of wire fraud and one cou nt of 
money laundering." /d. at 1013. 
7 Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d lOll, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). 
8/d. 
9/d. 
\0 /d. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4) states: 
Opportunity to Speak. (A) By a Party. Before imposing sentence, the court must: (i) provide 
the defendant's attorney an opportunity to speak on the defendant's behalf; (ii) address the 
defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to 
mitigate the sentence; and (iii) provide an attorney for the government an opportunity to 
speak equivalent to that of the defendant's attorney. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4). 
11 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1013. 
12/d. One victim objected stating that there were residual, second and third impacts that had 
developed over the ninety days since they had been in court. The district judge informed the victims 
that those developments could be brought to his attention by the prosecutor and did not let the 
victims speak. /d. 
13 Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d lOll, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). 
14 [d. Kenna "[sought] an order vacating Zvi's sentence, and commanding the district court 
to allow the victims to speak at the resentencing." [d. 
15 [d. at 1013-18. 
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A. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF "REASONABLY HEARD" 
Kenna and the district court disagreed as to the scope of the CVRA 
right to be "reasonably heard.,,16 Kenna argued that if he so chose, he 
was "entitled to speak in open court [during] Zvi's sentencing.,,17 The 
district court countered that "reasonably heard" vested judges with 
discretion about how to receive victim's statements. IS The Ninth Circuit 
found "none of the textual arguments dispositive" and concluded that 
both readings were plausible and that the statute was ambiguous. 19 
To resolve the ambiguity the court analyzed the statute's legislative 
history.2o When the Senate considered the CVRA in 2004, the primary 
sponsors, Senators Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein, indicated that the term 
"reasonably" should not provide an excuse for denying a victim the 
opportunity to directly address the court.21 Further, the Senators stated 
that the very purpose of the debated section of the CVRA was "to allow 
the victim to appear personally and directly address the court.'.22 
The Ninth Circuit found that the statements of the CVRA sponsors 
and the committee reports for the proposed amendment to the 
Constitution demonstrated a clear congressional intent to allow victims 
the right to speak and noted that the statute was enacted "to make victims 
full participants in the criminal justice system. ,,23 The court asserted that 
its interpretation of the CVRA "puts crime victims on the same footing" 
as "prosecutors and defendants [who] already have the right to speak at 
sentencing.',24 The court further stated that the language of the statute 
16 1d. at 10 13. 
17 Id. 
18 1d. See also Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 I (d)(2) (West 2007): 
Multiple crime victims. -- In a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims 
makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in subsection 
(a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not 
unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 377 I (d)(2) (West 2007). 
19 Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006). 
20 Id. 
21 1d. 
22 1d. The Ninth Circuit conceded that "floor statements are not given the same weight as 
some other types of legislative history," but noted that "floor statements made by the sponsors of 
legislation are given considerably more weight," particularly where no other legislator provides a 
contrary view. Id. The court also "note[dj that the CVRA passed as a compromise" after a 
prolonged "effort to amend the Constitution to protect victim's rights." Id. at 1016. The proposed 
constitutional amendment provided nearly identical language to that enacted in the CVRA. Id. "The 
Senate Report on the amendment notes that: ... '[Vlictims should always be given the power to 
determine the form of the statement.'" Id. (citing S. Rep. No 108-191, at 38 (2003)). 
23 Kenna at 10 16. 
24 1d. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A). 
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created "an indefeasible right to speak,,25 If a victim chooses to speak at 
more than one criminal sentencing, a court cannot deny allocution simply 
because the court believes "'[t]here just isn't anything else that could 
possibly be said.',,26 The court ultimately granted Kenna's petition for 
the writ of mandamus.27 
B. THE SCOPE OF THE OPINION 
Senior Circuit Judge Daniel Friedman agreed with the holding that 
under the CVRA, the district court could not justify its refusal to permit 
the victims to speak at Zvi's sentencing.28 However, he filed an opinion 
dubitante to express concern about "the seemingly broad sweep of the 
opinion.',29 Judge Friedman was concerned that the opinion provided "an 
absolute right to speak at sentencing" and stated that he would prefer to 
leave the issue open and issue an opinion with a more limited scope. 30 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision appears to promote the purpose of the 
CVRA. Crime victims in the Ninth Circuit can no longer be denied the 
right to allocute at "any public proceeding in the district court involving 
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.,,31 The district court 
must consider the effects of crimes upon victims at the time of decision 
regarding punishment, and allowing victims to speak in court enables 
this consideration.32 
However, 18 U.S.c. § 3771(d)(2) does grant the court the authority 
to create a reasonable procedure to avoid unduly complicated or lengthy 
proceedings. 33 Given the broad scope of the decision, the opinion failed 
to address how this section applies. 
25 Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d 10 II, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 
26 See id. (describing how victims now have the same rights as defendants). 
27 1d. at 1018. 
28 Id. (Friedman, J., dubitante). 
29 1d. 
30 1d. In addition, Judge Friedman raised a similar concern regarding the scope of the writ 
issued and would leave it up to the district court to determine whether other victims may speak. Id. 
at 1019. 
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 I (a)(4) (West 2007). 
32 Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d lOll, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2006). 
33 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1 (d)(2) (West 2007). 
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